Trojan Horse

Since the late 1990s, = federal agents=20 have reported systemic communications security breaches at = the=20 Department of Justice, FBI, DEA, the State Department, and = the White=20 House. Several of the alleged breaches, these agents say, = can be=20 traced to two hi-tech communications companies, Verint Inc.=20 (formerly Comverse Infosys), and Amdocs Ltd., that = respectively=20 provide major wiretap and phone billing/record-keeping = software=20 contracts for the US government. Together, Verint and Amdocs = form=20 part of the backbone of the government's domestic = intelligence=20 surveillance technology. Both companies are based in Israel = =96 having=20 arisen to prominence from that country's cornering of the=20 information technology market =96 and are heavily funded by = the=20 Israeli government, with connections to the Israeli military = and=20 Israeli intelligence (both companies have a long history of = board=20 memberships dominated by current and former Israeli military = and=20 intelligence officers). Verint is considered the world = leader in=20 "electronic interception" and hence an ideal private sector=20 candidate for wiretap outsourcing. Amdocs is the world's = largest=20 billing service for telecommunications, with some $2.8 = billion in=20 revenues in 2007, offices worldwide, and clients that = include the=20 top 25 phone companies in the United States that together = handle 90=20 percent of all call traffic among US residents. The = companies'=20 operations, sources suggest, have been infiltrated by = freelance=20 spies exploiting encrypted trapdoors in Verint/Amdocs = technology and=20 gathering data on Americans for transfer to Israeli = intelligence and=20 other willing customers (particularly organized crime). "The = fact of=20 the vulnerability of our telecom backbone is indisputable," = says a=20 high level US intelligence officer who has monitored the = fears among=20 federal agents. "How it came to pass, why nothing has been = done, who=20 has done what =96 these are the incendiary questions." If = the=20 allegations are true, the electronic communications gathered = up by=20 the NSA and other US intelligence agencies might be falling = into the=20 hands of a foreign government. Reviewing the available = evidence,=20 Robert David Steele, a former CIA case officer and today one = of the=20 foremost international proponents for "public intelligence = in the=20 public interest," tells me that "Israeli penetration of the = entire=20 US telecommunications system means that NSA's warrantless=20 wiretapping actually means Israeli warrantless = wiretapping."

As early as 1999, the National Security Agency issued a = warning=20 that records of US government telephone calls were ending up = in=20 foreign hands =96 Israel's, in particular. In 2002, = assistant US=20 Attorney General Robert F. Diegelman issued an eyes only = memo on the=20 matter to the chief information technology (IT) officers at = the=20 Department of Justice. IT officers oversee everything from = the kind=20 of cell phones agents carry to the wiretap equipment they = use in the=20 field; their defining purpose is secure communications. = Diegelman's=20 memo was a reiteration, with overtones of reprimand, of a = new IT=20 policy instituted a year earlier, in July 2001, in an = internal=20 Justice order titled "2640.2D Information Technology = Security."=20 Order 2640.2D stated that "Foreign Nationals shall not be = authorized=20 to access or assist in the development, operation, = management or=20 maintenance of Department IT systems." This might not seem = much to=20 blink at in the post-9/11 intel and security overhaul. Yet = 2640.2D=20 was issued a full two months before the Sept. 11 attacks. = What group=20 or groups of foreign nationals had close access to IT = systems at the=20 Department of Justice? Israelis, according to officials in = law=20 enforcement. One former Justice Department computer crimes=20 prosecutor tells me, speaking on background, "I've heard = that the=20 Israelis can listen in to our calls."

Retired CIA counterterrorism and counterintelligence = officer=20 Philip Giraldi says this is par for the course in the = history of=20 Israeli penetrations in the US He notes that Israel always = features=20 prominently in the annual FBI report called "Foreign = Economic=20 Collection and Industrial Espionage" =96 Israel is second = only to=20 China in stealing US business secrets. The 2005 FBI report = states,=20 for example, "Israel has an active program to gather = proprietary=20 information within the United States. These collection = activities=20 are primarily directed at obtaining information on military = systems=20 and advanced computing applications that can be used in = Israel's=20 sizable armaments industry." A key Israeli method, warns the = FBI=20 report, is computer intrusion.

In the big picture of US government spying on Americans, = the=20 story ties into 1994 legislation called the=20 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,=20 or CALEA, which effected a sea-change in methods of = electronic=20 surveillance. Gone are the days when wiretaps were conducted = through on-site tinkering with copper switches. CALEA = mandated=20 sweeping new powers of surveillance for the digital age, by = linking=20 remote computers into the routers and hubs of telecom firms = =96 a=20 spyware apparatus linked in real-time, all the time, to = American=20 telephones and modems. CALEA made spy equipment an = inextricable=20 ligature in our telephonic life. Top officials at the FBI = pushed for=20 the legislation, claiming it would improve security, but = many field=20 agents have spoken up to complain that CALEA has done = exactly the=20 opposite. The data-mining techniques employed by NSA in its=20 wiretapping exploits could not have succeeded without the = technology=20 mandated by CALEA. It could be argued that CALEA is = the hidden=20 heart of the NSA wiretap scandal.

THE VERINT = CONNECTION

According to former CIA = officer=20 Giraldi and other US intelligence sources, software = manufactured and=20 maintained by Verint, Inc. handles most of American law=20 enforcement's wiretaps. Says Giraldi: "Phone calls are = intercepted,=20 recorded, and transmitted to US investigators by Verint, = which=20 claims that it has to be =91hands on' with its = equipment to=20 maintain the system." Giraldi also notes Verint is = reimbursed for up=20 to 50 percent of its R&D costs by the Israeli Ministry = of=20 Industry and Trade. According to Giraldi, the extent of the = use of=20 Verint technology "is considered classified," but sources = have=20 spoken out and told Giraldi they are worried about the = security of=20 Verint wiretap systems. The key concern, says Giraldi, is = the issue=20 of a "trojan" embedded in the software.

A Trojan in information security hardware/software is a = backdoor=20 that can be accessed remotely by parties who normally would = not have=20 access to the secure system. Allegations of massive Trojan = spying=20 have rocked the Israeli business community in recent years. = An AP=20 article in 2005 noted, "Top Israeli blue chip = companies=85are=20 suspected of using illicit surveillance software to steal=20 information from their rivals and enemies." Over 40 = companies have=20 come under scrutiny. "It is the largest cybercrime case in = Israeli=20 history," Boaz Guttmann, a veteran cybercrimes investigator = with the=20 Israeli national police, tells me. "Trojan horse espionage = is part=20 of the way of life of companies in Israel. It's a culture of = spying."

This is of course the culture on which the US depends for = much of=20 its secure software for data encryption and telephonic = security.=20 "There's been a lot discussion of how much we should trust = security=20 products by Israeli telecom firms," says Philip Zimmerman, = one of=20 the legendary pioneers of encryption technology (Zimmerman = invented=20 the cryptographic and privacy authentication system known as = Pretty=20 Good Privacy, or PGP, now one of the basic modern standards = for=20 communications encryption). "Generally speaking, I wouldn't = trust=20 stuff made overseas for data security," says Zimmerman. "A = guy at=20 NSA InfoSec" =96 the information security division of the = National=20 Security Agency =96 "once told me, =91Foreign-made crypto is = our=20 nightmare.' But to be fair, as our domestic electronics = industry=20 becomes weaker and weaker, foreign-made becomes inevitable." = Look at=20 where the expertise is, Zimmerman adds: Among the ranks of = the=20 International Association for Cryptological Research, which = meets=20 annually, there is a higher percentage of Israelis than any = other=20 nationality. The Israeli-run Verint is today the provider of = telecom=20 interception systems deployed in over 50 countries.

Carl Cameron, chief politics correspondent at Fox News = Channel,=20 is one of the few reporters to look into federal agents' = deepening=20 distress over possible trojans embedded in Verint = technology. In a=20 wide-ranging four-part investigation into Israeli-linked = espionage=20 that aired in December 2001, Cameron made a number of = startling=20 discoveries regarding Verint, then known as Comverse = Infosys.=20 Sources told Cameron that "while various FBI inquiries into = Comverse=20 have been conducted over the years," the inquiries had "been = halted=20 before the actual equipment has ever been thoroughly tested = for=20 leaks." Cameron also noted a 1999 internal FCC document = indicating=20 that "several government agencies expressed deep concerns = that too=20 many unauthorized non-law enforcement personnel can access = the=20 wiretap system." Much of this access was facilitated through = "remote=20 maintenance."

Immediately following the Cameron report, Comverse = Infosys=20 changed its name to Verint, saying the company was = "maturing." (The=20 company issued no response to Cameron's allegations, nor did = it=20 threaten a lawsuit.) Meanwhile, security officers at DEA, an = adjunct=20 of the Justice Department, began examining the agency's own=20 relationship with Comverse/Verint. In 1997, DEA transformed = its=20 wiretap infrastructure with the $25 million procurement from = Comverse/Verint of a technology called "T2S2" =96 = "translation and=20 transcription support services" =96 with Comverse/Verint = contracted to=20 provide the hardware and software, plus "support services, = training,=20 upgrades, enhancements and options throughout the life of = the=20 contract," according to the "contracts and acquisitions" = notice=20 posted on the DEA's website. This was unprecedented. Prior = to 1997,=20 DEA staff used equipment that was developed and maintained = in-house.=20

But now Cameron's report raised some ugly questions of=20 vulnerability in T2S2.

The director of security programs at DEA, Heidi = Raffanello, was=20 rattled enough to issue an internal communiqu=E9 on the = matter, dated=20 Dec. 18, 2001, four days after the final installment in the = Cameron=20 series. Referencing the Fox News report, she worried that = "Comverse=20 remote maintenance" was "not addressed in the C&A = [contracts and=20 acquisitions] process." She also cited the concerns in = Justice=20 Department order 2640.2D, and noted that the "Administrator" = =96=20 meaning then DEA head Asa Hutchinson =96 had been briefed. = Then there=20 was this stunner: "It remains unclear if Comverse personnel = are=20 security cleared, and if so, who are they and what type of=20 clearances are on record=85.Bottom line we should have = caught it." On=20 its face, the Raffanello memo is a frightening glimpse into = a=20 bureaucracy caught with its pants down.

American law enforcement was not alone in suspecting T2S2 = equipment purchased from Comverse/Verint. In November 2002, = sources=20 in the Dutch counterintelligence community began airing what = they=20 claimed was "strong evidence that the Israeli secret service = has=20 uncontrolled access to confidential tapping data collected = by the=20 Dutch police and intelligence services," according to the = Dutch=20 broadcast radio station Evangelische Omroep (EO). In = January=20 2003, the respected Dutch technology and computing magazine, = c't, ran a follow-up to the EO scoop, headlined = "Dutch=20 Tapping Room not Kosher." The article began: "All tapping = equipment=20 of the Dutch intelligence services and half the tapping = equipment of=20 the national police force=85is insecure and is leaking = information to=20 Israel." The writer, Paul Wouters, goes on to discuss the = T2S2=20 tap-ware "delivered to the government in the last few years = by the=20 Israeli company Verint," and quoted several cryptography = experts on=20 the viability of remote monitoring of encrypted "blackbox" = data.=20 Wouters writes of this "blackbox cryptography":

"=85a very important part of strong cryptography is a = good=20 random source. Without a proper random generator, or worse, = with an=20 intentionally crippled random generator, the resulting = ciphertext=20 becomes trivial to break. If there is one single unknown = chip=20 involved with the random generation, such as a hardware = accelerator=20 chip, all bets are off=85.If you can trust the hardware and = you have=20 access to the source code, then it should theoretically be = possible=20 to verify the system. This, however, can just not be done = without=20 the source code."

Yet, as Wouters was careful to add, "when the equipment = was=20 bought from the Israelis, it was agreed that no one except = [Verint]=20 personnel was authorized to touch the systems....Source code = would=20 never be available to anyone."

Cryptography pioneer Philip Zimmerman warns that "you = should=20 never trust crypto if the source code isn't published. Open = source=20 code means two things: if there are deliberate backdoors in = the=20 crypto, peer review will reveal those backdoors. If there = are=20 inadvertent bugs in the crypto, they too will be discovered. = Whether=20 the weaknesses are by accident or design, they will be = found. If the=20 weakness is by design, they will not want to publish the = source=20 code. Some of the best products we know have been subject to = open=20 source review: Linux; Apache. The most respected crypto = products=20 have been tested through open source. The little padlock in = the=20 corner when you visit a browser? You're going through a = protocol=20 called Secure Socket Layer. Open source tested and an = Internet=20 standard. FireFox, the popular and highly secure browser, is = all=20 open source."

THE CALEA = CONNECTION

None of US law enforcement's = problems=20 with Amdocs and Verint could have come to pass without the = changes=20 mandated by the Communications Assistance for Law = Enforcement Act of=20 1994, which, as noted, sought to lock spyware into telecom = networks.=20 CALEA, to cite the literature, requires that terrestrial = carriers,=20 cellular phone services and other telecom entities enable = the=20 government to intercept "all wire and oral communications = carried by=20 the carrier concurrently with their transmission." T2S2 = technology=20 fit the bill perfectly: Tied into the network, T2S2 = bifurcates the=20 line without interrupting the data-stream (a T2S2 = bifurcation is=20 considered virtually undetectable). One half of the = bifurcated line=20 is recorded and stored in a remote tapping room; the other = half=20 continues on its way from your mouth or keyboard to your = friend's.=20 (What is "T2S2"? To simplify: The S2 computer collects and = encrypts=20 the data; the T2 receives and decrypts.)

CALEA was touted as a law enforcement triumph, the work = of=20 decades of lobbying by FBI. Director Louis Freeh went so far = as to=20 call it the bureau's "highest legislative priority." Indeed, = CALEA=20 was the widest expansion of the government's electronic = surveillance=20 powers since the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, = which=20 mandated carefully limited conditions for wiretaps. Now the=20 government could use coercive powers in ordering telecom = providers=20 to "devise solutions" to law enforcement's "emerging=20 technology-generated problems" (imposing a $10,000 per day = penalty=20 on non-compliant carriers). The government's hand would be=20 permanently inserted into the design of the nation's telecom = infrastructure. Law professor Lillian BeVier, of the = University of=20 Virginia, writes extensively of the problems inherent to = CALEA. "The=20 rosy scenario imagined by the drafters cannot survive a = moment's=20 reflection," BeVier observes. "While it is conventionally = portrayed=20 as =91but the latest chapter in the thirty year history of = the federal=20 wiretap laws,' CALEA is not simply the next installment of a = technologically impelled statutory evolution. Instead, in = terms of=20 the nature and magnitude of the interests it purports to=20 =91compromise' and the industry it seeks to regulate, in = terms of the=20 extent to which it purports to coerce private sector = solutions to=20 public sector problems, and in terms of the foothold it = gives=20 government to control the design of telecommunications = networks,=20 the Act is a paradigm shift. On close and = disinterested=20 inspection, moreover, CALEA appears to embody potentially = wrong-headed sacrifices of privacy principles, flawed and = incomplete=20 conceptions of law enforcement's ends and means, and = an=20 imperfect appreciation of the incompatible incentives of the = players=20 in the game that would inevitably be played in the = process of=20 its implementation." (emphasis mine)

The real novelty =96 and the danger =96 of CALEA is that = telecom=20 networks are today configured so that they are vulnerable to = surveillance. "We've deliberately weakened the computer and = phone=20 networks, making them much less secure, much more vulnerable = both to=20 legal surveillance and illegal hacking," says former DOJ = cybercrimes=20 prosecutor Mark Rasch. "Everybody is much less secure in = their=20 communications since the adopting of CALEA. So how are you = going to=20 have secure communications? You have to secure the = communications=20 themselves, because you cannot have a secure network. To do = this,=20 you need encryption. What CALEA forced businesses and = individuals to=20 do is go to third parties to purchase encryption technology. = What is=20 the major country that the US purchases IT encryption from = overseas?=20 I would say it's a small Middle Eastern democracy. What = we've done=20 is the worst of all worlds. We've made sure that most = communications=20 are subject to hacking and interception by bad guys. At the = same=20 time, the bad guys =96 organized crime, terrorist operations = =96 can=20 very easily encrypt their communications." It is notable = that the=20 first CALEA-compliant telecom systems installed in the US = were=20 courtesy of Verint Inc.

THE AMDOCS = CONNECTION

If a phone is dialed in the = US, Amdocs=20 Ltd. likely has a record of it, which includes who you = dialed and=20 how long you spoke. This is known as transactional call = data.=20 Amdocs' biggest customers in the US are AT&T and = Verizon, which=20 have collaborated widely with the Bush Administration's = warrantless=20 wiretapping programs. Transactional call data has been = identified as=20 a key element in NSA data mining to look for "suspicious" = patterns=20 in communications.

Over the last decade, Amdocs has been the target of = several=20 investigations looking into whether individuals within the = company=20 shared sensitive US government data with organized crime = elements=20 and Israeli intelligence services. Beginning in 1997, the = FBI=20 conducted a far-flung inquiry into alleged spying by an = Israeli=20 employee of Amdocs, who worked on a telephone billing = program=20 purchased by the CIA. According to Paul Rodriguez and J. = Michael=20 Waller, of Insight Magazine, which broke the story in = May of=20 2000, the targeted Israeli had apparently also facilitated = the=20 tapping of telephone lines at the Clinton White House = (recall Monica=20 Lewinsky's testimony before Ken Starr: the president, she = claimed,=20 had warned her that "a foreign embassy" was listening to = their phone=20 sex, though Clinton under oath later denied saying this). = More than=20 two dozen intelligence, counterintelligence, law-enforcement = and=20 other officials told Insight that a "daring = operation," run=20 by Israeli intelligence, had "intercepted telephone and = modem=20 communications on some of the most sensitive lines of the US = government on an ongoing basis." Insight's chief=20 investigative reporter, Paul Rodriguez, told me in an e-mail = that=20 the May 2000 spy probe story "was (and is) one of the = strangest I've=20 ever worked on, considering the state of alert, concern and=20 puzzlement" among federal agents. According to the = Insight=20 report, FBI investigators were particularly unnerved over=20 discovering the targeted Israeli subcontractor had somehow = gotten=20 his hands on the FBI's "most sensitive telephone numbers, = including=20 the Bureau's =91black' lines used for wiretapping." "Some of = the=20 listed numbers," the Insight article added, "were = lines that=20 FBI counterintelligence used to keep track of the suspected = Israeli=20 spy operation. The hunted were = tracking the=20 hunters." Rodriguez confirmed the panic this caused in = American=20 Intel"It's a huge security nightmare," one senior US = official told=20 him. "The implications are severe," said a second official. = "All I=20 can tell you is that we think we know how it was done," a = third=20 intelligence executive told Rodriguez. "That alone is = serious=20 enough, but it's the unknown that has such deep = consequences." No=20 charges, however, were made public in the case. (What = happened=20 behind the scenes depends on who you talk to in law = enforcement:=20 When FBI counterintelligence sought a warrant for the = Israeli=20 subcontractor, the Justice Department strangely refused to=20 cooperate, and in the end no warrant was issued. FBI = investigators=20 were baffled.)

London Sunday Times reporter Uzi Mahnaimi quotes = sources=20 in Tel Aviv saying that during this period e-mails from = President=20 Clinton had also been intercepted by Israeli intelligence.=20 Mahnaimi's May 2000 article reveals that the operation = involved=20 "hacking into White House computer systems during intense=20 speculation about the direction of the peace process." = Israeli=20 intelligence had allegedly infiltrated a company called = Telrad,=20 subcontracted by Nortel, to develop a communications system = for the=20 White House. According to the Sunday Times, "Company = managers=20 were said to have been unaware that virtually undetectable = chips=20 installed during manufacture made it possible for outside = agents to=20 tap into the flow of data from the White House."

In 1997, detectives with the Los Angeles Police = Department,=20 working in tandem with the Secret Service, FBI, and DEA, = found=20 themselves suffering a similar inexplicable collapse in=20 communications security. LAPD was investigating Israeli = organized=20 crime: drug runners and credit card thieves based in Israel = and=20 L.A., with tentacles in New York, Miami, Las Vegas, and = Egypt. The=20 name of the crime group and its members remains classified = in=20 "threat assessment" papers this reporter obtained from LAPD, = but the=20 documents list in some detail the colorful scope of the = group's=20 operations: $1.4 million stolen from Fidelity Investments in = Boston=20 through sophisticated computer fraud; extortion and = kidnapping of=20 Israelis in LA and New York; cocaine distribution in = connection with=20 Italian, Russian, Armenian and Mexican organized crime; = money=20 laundering; and murder. The group also had access to = extremely=20 sophisticated counter-surveillance technology and data, = which was a=20 disaster for LAPD. According to LAPD internal documents, the = Israeli=20 crime group obtained the unlisted home phone, cell phone, = and pager=20 numbers of some 500 of LAPD's narcotics investigators, as = well as=20 the contact information for scores of federal agents =96 = black info,=20 numbers unknown even to the investigators' kin. The Israelis = even=20 set up wiretaps of LAPD investigators, grabbing from = cell-phones and=20 landlines conversations with other agents =96 FBI and DEA, = mostly =96=20 whose names and phone numbers were also traced and grabbed. =

LAPD was horrified, and as the word got out of the = seeming total=20 breakdown in security, the shock spread to agents at DEA, = FBI and=20 even CIA, who together spearheaded an investigation. It = turned out=20 that the source of much of this black Intel could be traced = to a=20 company called J&J Beepers, which was getting its phone = numbers=20 from a billing service that happened to be a subsidiary of = Amdocs.=20

A source familiar with the inquiries into Amdocs put to = me=20 several theories regarding the allegations of espionage = against the=20 company. "Back in the early 1970s, when it became clear that = AT&T was going to be broken up and that there was an = imminent=20 information and technology revolution, Israel understood = that it had=20 a highly-educated and highly-worldly population and it made = a few=20 calculated economic and diplomatic discoveries," the source = says.=20 "One was that telecommunications was something they could = do:=20 because it doesn't require natural resources, but just = intellect,=20 training and cash. They became highly involved in=20 telecommunications. Per capita, Israel is probably the = strongest=20 telecommunications nation in the world. AT&T break-up = occurs in=20 1984; Internet technology explodes; and Israel has all of = these=20 companies aggressively buying up contracts in the form of = companies=20 like Amdocs. Amdocs started out as a tiny company and now = it's the=20 biggest billing service for telecommunications in the world. = They=20 get this massive telecommunications network underway. Like = just=20 about everything in Israel, it's a government sponsored = undertaking.=20

"So it's been argued that Amdocs was using its billing = records as=20 an intelligence-gathering exercise because its executive = board over=20 the years has been heavily peopled by retired and current = members of=20 the Israeli government and military. They used this as an=20 opportunity to collect information about worldwide telephone = calls.=20 As an intelligence-gathering phenomenon, an analyst with an = MIT=20 degree in algorithms would rather have 50 pages of who = called who=20 than 50 hours of actual conversation. Think about = conversations with=20 friends, husbands, wives. That raw information doesn't mean=20 anything. But if there's a pattern of 30 phone calls over = the course=20 of a day, that can mean a lot. It's a much simpler = algorithm."

Another anonymous source =96 a former CIA operative =96 = tells me that=20 US intelligence agents who have aired their concerns about = Verint=20 and Amdocs have found themselves attacked from all sides. = "Once it's=20 learned that an individual is doing footwork on this [the=20 Verint/Amdocs question], he or she is typically identified = somehow=20 as a troublemaker, an instigator, and is hammered = mercilessly," says=20 the former CIA operative. "Typically, what happens is the = individual=20 finds him or herself in a scenario where their retirement is = jeopardized =96 and worse. The fact that if you simply take = a look at=20 this question, all of a sudden you're an Arabist or = anti-Semitic =96=20 it's pure baloney, because I will tell you first-hand that = people=20 whose heritage lies back in that country have heavily worked = this=20 matter. You can't buy that kind of dedication."

The former CIA operative adds, "There is no defined = policy, at=20 this time, for how to deal with this [security issues = involving=20 Israel] =96 other than wall it off, contain it. It's not = cutting it.=20 Not after 9/11. The funeral pyre that burned on for months = at the=20 bottom of the rubble told a lot of people they did not need = to be=20 =91politically correct.' The communications nexuses [i.e.=20 Amdocs/Verint] didn't occur yesterday; they started many = years ago.=20 And that's a major embarrassment to organizations that would = like to=20 say they're on top of things and not co-opted or = compromised. As you=20 start to work this, you soon learn that many people have = either=20 looked the other way or have been co-opted along the way. = Some=20 people, when they figure out what has occurred, are highly=20 embarrassed to realize that they've been duped. Because many = of them=20 are bureaucrats, they don't want to be made to look as = stupid as=20 they are. So they just go along with it. Sometimes, it's = just that=20 simple."

How Israeli Backdoor Technology Penetrated the US = Government's=20 Telecom System and Compromised National = Security